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The Individual's Duties: a Case Study 
in International Human Rights Law 
In this paper I would like to draw attention to the fact that the idea of 
connecting human rights with a detailed catalog of the individual's duties is 
based on a well elaborated, general theory on the individual, and reflects the 
particular human rights conception of the Third World. This conception, 
together with some other characteristics of the new ideas generating a radical 
reorientation in the field of international human rights in the sixties and 
seventies, appeared for the first time in an international human rights 
convention in the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. 
The chief question that arises concerns how this new idea operates in a 
document discussing obligations typically towards state parties. This paper 
focuses on this principal problem and has the aim of pointing out the 
theoretical and practical difficulties arising from a detailed regulation of the 
individual's duties in an international human rights convention. 
Changes in the field of international human rights 
Since the late sixties, important changes have taken place in the field of 
international human rights, and primarily in the United Nations human rights 
activities. These changes were inspired by the needs and problems of the 
developing countries. Havint acquired their independence, these countries had 
to face problems of essentially an economic nature. Their goals can be 
characterized by three fundamental categories: economic self-determination, 
development and the New International Economic Order. 
The social goals determined by by these problems have greatly 
influenced social, political and economic theories in the Third World. 
In accordance with these goals, the second generation of human rights 
was emphasized, as against the classical human rights theories, by the new Third 
World conception of human rights that was taking shape at that time. All this 
also applies to the African continent and the African human rights conception. 
At the human rights conference held in Dar-es-Salaam in 1973, some 
participants emphasized that there was no sense in discussing civil and political 
rights because these pertain to a state's domestic jurisdiction and are of only 
marginal importance with respect to the development of African states. The 
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economic, social and cultural rights were of real significance, because these 
rights reflect well the economic and social goals.1 
As a consequence of the new conception, international human rights 
theories and the practice of various bodies and organizations of the United 
Nations began to focus on economic, social and cultural rights. This shift has a 
close bearing on the fact that, since the beginning of the sixties, the countries of 
the develping world have played an ever more important role in the 
organization. 
The spreading of the second generation of human rights can be 
observed in the decade after the significant conference in Teheran in 1968.2 
However, this was only the first step, marking the beginning of the change, and 
not its completion. Subsequently, a new generation of human rights has 
emerged and collective rights have received new emphasis, which again reflects 
the peculiar human rights conception of the developing countries. 
However, the diluted catalog has added a considerable load to the 
theoretical system of human rights, with further contradictions, and the third 
generation of human rights and peoples' rights has become the most chaotic 
and obscure area of the international human rights theory. Although an in 
creasing number of studies are concerned with these problems, the outlines of a 
new, comprehensive international human rights theory have not yet been 
developed.5 
Connecting human rights with the individual's duties constitutes one 
element of these new ideas, and seems to give birth to some serious problems, 
similarly to the conceptions of peoples' rights and of the third generation of 
human rights. 
1 UN Doc. ST/TAO/HR/48. para.4l. 
2 See especially paras. 12-14. and 18. of the proclamation, in: J.A. Joyce, Human Rights: 
International Documents, Vol. I., Alphen aan den Rijn 1978. pp.27-28. On the change in UN human 
rights activity, see J. Donelly, "Recent trends in UN Human Rights activity: description and 
polemic", International Organization 35(1981) pp.633-655- See also P. Alston, "The alleged demise 
of political human rights at the UN: a reply to Donelly" Int.Org. 37(1983) pp.537-546.; D.P. 
Forsytbe, "Socioeconomic Human Rights: The United Nations, the United States and Beyond" 
Human Rights Quarterly 4(1982) pp.433-449-
3 See for example, K.J. Partscb, "Recent Developments in the field of Peoples' Rights" 
Human Rights Law Journal 7(1986) pp.177-182.; P. Alston, "Conjuring up human rights: a proposal 
for quality control" American Journal of International Law 78(1984) . pp.607-621.; R.J. 
Tuxmubammedov, "Tretyje pokolenyije prav cseloveka i prava narodov" Szovjetszkoje 
Goszudarsztvo i Pravo 1986/11. pp.106-113.; V.A. Kartasbkin, "Prava cseloveka" Szovjetszkoje 
Goszudarsztvo i Pravo 1987/1. 125-127.; D.U. Vargas, "La Troisième Génération des Droits de 
l'Homme" Recueil des Cours 184/1984-I/pp.359-375.; J.B. Marie, "Relations between peoples' 
rights and human rights" Human Rights Law Journal 7/1986/ pp.195-204.; MaviV., "Szolidaritási 
jogok vagy emberi jogok harmadik nemzedéke?" (Solidarity Rights or the Third Generation of 
Human Rights?) Állam- és Jogtudomány XXX/1-2. pp.l51-173;S/>. Marks, "Emerging Human 
Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s?" Rutgers Law Review 33(1981) pp.435-450. 
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The content and extent of the individual' duties in the African Charter 
In the Charter,4 a separate chapter is devoted to the individual's duties 
(Part I, Chapter II), although it consists of only three articles (Articles 27-29). 
This fact indicates the .independent nature and significance of the individual's 
duties among the elements of the theoretical conception prevailing in the 
drafting process. 
First of all, it is generally stipulated that each individual has duties 
towards his family and society, the state and other legally recognized 
communities. This general provision is not completely unknowm in international 
human rights instruments. Some occasional and vague references to the 
individual's duties were made by the drafters of the two Covenants of 1966 
(paragraph 5 of the Preambles), and also in the Universal Declaration (Article 
29/1/1), and in the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 32/1/1), 
and in the American Declaration (Article XXIX). However one can agree with 
Gittleman that these references, except for the American Declaration, do not 
indicate any independent conception of the individual's duties.5 
It is noteworthy that in these instruments the duties are towards the 
"community". The Charter provides certain duties towards the state and other 
legally recognized communities as well, which seems fairly unusual. 
For instance, "other legally recognized" communities may just as well 
mean a political party or a trade union. In this case, a particular African problem 
emerges. Ngom writes that in some African countries it is obligatory for the 
citizens to be members of the only party.6 Balanda refers in this context to the 
trade unions.7 If that is the case, the individual has duties towards these kinds of 
"communities", and these duties can be enforced by the state (Article 1 of the 
Charter). 
Article 27/2/ provides that the rights of the individual are limited by the 
rights of others, collective security, morality, and common interest. 
The latter three expressions typically appear in clawback clauses of 
various specified rights, and not in a general clause. With regard to the function 
of an international human rights convention, the appropriate and less obscure 
drafting solution would have been that limitations stemming from security, 
morality, etc. should be regulated together with specified human rights 
according to the character of those rights. Drafting in more concrete terms 
would have provided a less ambiguous basis for implementation. 
4 International Legal Materials 21(1982) pp.58-68. 
5 R. Gittleman, "The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis" 
Virginia Journal of International Law 22(1982) p.676. 
6 B.S. Ngom,- Les droits de l'jomme et PAfrique, Paris 1984. p.69. 
7 M.L Balanda, "African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights" Österreichische 
Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 1983/6. p.144. 
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After the general rules, the African convention details the individual's 
duties of various kinds, specifying in certain cases the social entities towards 
which the duty exists. The list seems to specify the previous general clause. 
However, it is not clear whether this is an exhaustive list, or the Charter merely 
gives some important examples pertaining to the individual's duties. After a 
closer look, this problem turns out to be of no importance, because these 
specified duties are formulated in almost as general a manner as the general 
clause. 
Let us consider these detailed duties (Articles 28-29): 
— towards other individuals: respect without discrimination; mutual 
respect and tolerance; 
— towards parents: respect; their maintenance in cases of need; 
— towards the family: respect; preservation of its harmonious 
development and promotion of its cohesion; 
— towards the nation: preservation and strengthening of its solidarity; 
its service via physical and intellectual abilities; preservation and strengthening 
of its independence; 
— towards the society: preservation and strengthening of its solidarity; 
promption of its moral well-being; 
— towards the state: to respect its security; 
— towards unspecified entitites: to work to the best of one's abilities 
and competence; payment of taxes; preservation and strengthening of the 
territorial integrity of one's country; defense of one's country; preservation and 
strengthening of the positive African cultural values; contribution to the best of 
one's abilities to the promotion and achievement of African unity. 
This is the first such dateiled enumeration of the individual's duties in 
connenction with human rights to appear in an international convention. Similar 
lists can be discovered in other instruments, e.g. in the constitutions of various 
states.8 Nevertheless, these regulations related to national laws and cannot lie 
within the scope of our closer examination. However, the generality of 
constitutional norms and their application cause numerous problems, some of 
which have to be faced in the process of the implementation of the African 
convention, too. 
The only international human rights instrument which detailed the 
individual's duties before the Charter was the American Declaration. In this 
document, similarly to the American convention, a separate part is devoted to 
the individual's duties. Certain duties can be observed to apper in both 
® A survey is given on these constitutional provisions concerning also the Third World 
countries, in: A Does, Study on the Individual's Duties to the Community and the Limitations on 
Human Rights and Freedoms under Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN 
Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub.2/432 Rev.l. 1 July 1980. paras. 206-383-, 399-437.; as to the duty provisions in 
African constitutions, see, in: O. Eze, "Prospects for International Protection of Human rights in 
Africa" The African Review 1974. pp.82-84.; V.O. Umozurike, "The Present State of Human Rights in 
Africa" Österreichische Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 1986/6. pp.113-114. 
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documents (payment of taxes; defense of the country; endorsement of the 
parents; work to the best of the individual's abilities). However, the differences 
between the provisions of the American Declaration and the related ones of the 
African Charter are more striking than the similarities. 
The American instrument enumerates a number of duties which do not 
feature in the African regulation, e.g. the duty of every person: to acquire at least 
an elementary education (Article XXXI); to vote in the popular elections in his 
country (Article XXXII); to hold any public office if elected (Article XXXIX) , etc. 
There are hardly any articles regulating the individual's duties directly 
towards the state which would be suitable for the direct restriction of human 
rights. We can observe only two duties of this kind: to abey the law and other 
legitimate commands (Article XXXIII) and to perform civil or military service in 
the event of defense of one's country or of public disaster (Article XXXIV). 
It can be seen that the formulation of the individual's duties in the 
American Declaration is fairly concrete. A large proportion of these duties 
appear in a specified form, as far as possible in a declaration. This cannot be 
said of the African convention, although it would be important in the case of a 
treaty to eliminate the possibilities of voluntary interpretation in the process of 
application. In a functional sense, the formulation of the American Declaration 
actually fits an international treaty much better than the undefined and vague 
provisions on the individual's duties in the Arican Charter. 
In the course of a survey of the differences between the two 
instruments, one characteristic of the Charter inevitably emerges: the effort to 
tighten the area of state obligations in respect of granted rights. This 
characteristic is strengthened by the generally accepted limitations on rights 
used in the convention. 
Article 27/2/ provides that the rights individuals are limited by 
collective security and common interest. As indicated previously, these limiting 
factors are regulated in a general clause, not in clawback clauses attached to 
specified rights, and hence this limitation refers to all of the granted human 
rights. 
These general categories may be invoked in connection with very 
different restrictions placed upon human rights. The interpretation of these 
categories, as of many others, is largely subject to the discretion of state parties. 
It will be quite difficult for the Commission established by the Charter -to 
challenge any kind of state interpretation, perhaps apart from the most extreme 
cases. Questions such as what is the common interest of the given society and 
what qualifies as dangerous to the security of the given collectivity can hardly be 
decided by the Commission. Theoretically, of course, there is a limit to state 
interpretation, namely the principle of good faith. However, in the absence of a 
clear and distinct international and regional strandard concerning the content 
of these two terms, the rule of good faith itself becomes weak as a guiding 
principle in this respect. 
In connection with the limitations set upon human rights granted by the 
convention, participant states may effectively invoke certain provisions of Article 
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29, which are similar in nature to collective security and common interest: for 
example, not to compromise the security of the state; to strengthen national 
independence and territorial integrity. In a number of cases, it is clearly 
discernible towards which communities or social entities the individual's duties 
exist in the Charter. However, duties towards, for instance, the society or the 
nation are ineffective unless someone enforces them in their name. This is so 
even in the area of internal law. In addition, in international law the categories 
of nation and society themselves are completely meaningless, apart from one 
aspect (self-determination).9 
It is the state that represents the nation and the society, even against or 
towards the smaller communities and indivuduals constituting their parts. This 
also applies to the family, the individual's parents and other individuals, with 
slight modifications. Thus, in the last resort, the duties provided by Articles 27-
29 towards unspecified entities will be enforced by the state as the only 
representative of these entities in the international sphere. 
What is important is not the bearer of the rights, but the entity which 
enforces these rights, that is to say the state. The fact, the form and the time of 
enforcement reflect the interest of the state, although these interests may often 
coincide with those of the bearers of the rights. Enforcement for the benefit of 
any abstract bearer of rights may be used, potentially, to justify limitations of 
some human rights granted in the African convention, the observance of which 
is an obligation of the state. 
There are a number of duties stipulated in Articles 27-29 of the Charter 
which, in connection with human rights, may all serve as a basis for setting limits 
to granted rights. Even in the abstract, prima facie, the defense of 
independence and African cultural values can be brought up against the right to 
property, the requirement of security against the right to movement, the 
preservation of national and social solidarity against the freedom of expression, 
etc. One author raises the question of whether a dependence between rights 
and duties exists in the Charter,10 because only in this case does the possibility 
exist for a limitation of this kind. There can only be an affirmative answer. Article 
27/2/ explicitly establishes this dependence for its own provision. As concerns 
the specification of this article, the specified duties of Articles 28-29 are 
therefore also connected with rights. Even if Articles 28-29 are independent of 
Article 27/2/, this connection, and at the same time the possibility of limitation, 
may be established. Articles detailing duties constitute a part of the convention, 
9 See the position of Thailand on this issue, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub.2/ 432 Rev.l. 
para.353.; on the term "people" in the same context, see Balanda, loc.cit. supra n.7.; R.H. Jackson, 
"Quasi states, dual regimes and new classical theory" Int. Org. 41(1987) p.547.; the Japanese and 
French position in the UNESCO, 4.XC/VR.9. p.65. and 4.XC/Nr.5. p.23. cited by S. Bastid, "Les 
droits des peuples dans le plan à moyen terme (1984-1989) de l'UNESCO" in: Le droit des peuples 
à disposer d'eux-mêmes. Mélanges offerts à Charles Chaumont Paris 1984. p.18. 
1 0 Ngom, op.cit. supra n.6. at p.73. 
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in the same way as articles stipulating rights, and state parties have undertaken 
to give effect to all the provisions. 
The state protects the rights of the individual and judges whether the 
individual fails or not to fulfil his duties. There are three factors which prevent 
one from speaking of sui generis regulation in the Charter, or of the individual's 
duties independent of rights. 
1. According to paragraph 6 of the Preamble: "Considering that the 
enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the performance of duties on the 
part of everyone." 
2. Human rights and the individual's duties refer to the same relations 
of social life, and in these relations they typically exist as competing factors. 
Thus, in most cases it is necessary to decide which of the two should be 
preferred. 
3. One of the most important principles of treaty interpretation is the 
fiction of cohesion. The possible conflict described in the second point also 
appears on a legal level, and the problem of the connection between rights and 
duties arieses in the Charter. 
Embracing such a great area of the individual's duties, the Charter 
further widens the possibilities for the state to interpret the convention 
according to its own interest. However, a convention allowing too wide an area 
of interpretation cannocperform its function well, beceause it cannot give 
appropriate normative security concerning the object. Through their necessary 
connection with human rights, the individual's duties may be used to limit the 
grandted rights. The question is what reasons are provided by the human rights 
conception of the Third World constituting the theoretical background 6f the 
Charter for this detailed regulation of the individual's duties. 
The theoretical background 
The idea of placing emphasis on the individual's duties is based on the 
particular conception of the individual that has arisen in developing countries. 
African international lawyers and sociologists have built up a system of 
arguments which yields a theoretical badkground for regulation of the 
individual's duties in the Charter. 
Although this conception to a certain extent consists of commonplaces, 
this does not mean that these suggestions do not include numerous acceptable 
elements. Furthermore, there can be no doubt that the authors grouping and 
skilfully developing these commonplaces have reached a new and original 
theory. 
The starting point and axiom is that the position of individuals may be 
interpreted only in the context of the community. The personality can reach its 
accomplishment only in social activities. 
Personality is not merely, and not primarily, an autonomous value, but 
also a social one, which takes shape in social life. One of the aspects of the 
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realtionship between the individuals and the community can be described more 
concretely by the categories of right and duty. The individual has not only rights, 
but also duties towards his community. This claim is supported by the 
commonplace that each right has its corollary duty.11 However, these tenets are 
not original ones. Article 29/1/ of the Universal Declaration was drafted under 
these principles. In the case of the American Declaration, it was partly these 
ideas which inspired the drafters, as expressed in its Preamble.12 In fact, the 
African theory has gone beyond these claims, and has tried to put stress on 
African peculiarities. First of all, the African individual is contrasted with the 
isolated, abstract Western type.13 This latter is described as an individual 
without responsibility and opposed to the community. In this way, the theory 
can emphasize the African peculiarities, which roughly comprise the following 
main elements: preindustrial, traditional communities; reciprocity; the idea of 
solidarity; a close relationship between the community and the individual; 
cooperation between individuals as the main strength of social activities.14 
The principle of reciprocity penetrates into all segments of social life,15 
and therefore giving and getting are connected more directly than in other, 
somewhat more modern types of community. 
Thus, all rights are directly linked with duties towards other individuals 
and the community, and the possibility of an individual's autonomy is fairly 
limited. Because of the structure of communal reproduction and the close 
1 1 Balanda, op.cit. supra n.7., at pp.138-139-; Ngom, idem, at pp.73-74.; A Bassat, 
"Droits de l'homme et africanité" Penant 1984/94-/785. pp.286-287.; B.O. Okere, "The Protection 
of Human Rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights" Human Rights 
Quarterly 1984/2/ pp.148-149-; /.A Menkiti, "Person and Community in African Traditional 
Thought", in: African Philosopy (ed. R.A Wright) Lanham 1984. p. 18.; Iba der Tbiam, "Human 
Rights in African Cultural Traditions" Human Rights Teaching 1982. pp.4-6.; J. Mbiti, "Man in 
African Religion" in: Africa and the West (eds. I.J. Mowoe and R. Bjomson) New York 1986. pp.55-
67. 
1 2 E/CN.4/Sub.2/432 Rev.l. paras.147-189-
1 3 Bassat, op.cit. supra n . l l . , at p.286. 
1 4 Menkiti, loc.cit. supra n . l l . , A Akinjogbin, "La spécifité et la dymanique des cultures 
negro-africanies: La region yoruba" in: Spécifités et convergences culturelles dans l'Afrique au sud 
du Sahara UNESCO, Paris 1986. p.66.; Tbiam, op.cit. supra n . l l . , at p.8.; Okere, loc.cit. supra n . l l . ; 
Balanda, op.cit. supra n.7., at pp.138-139-; Bassat, idem, at pp.287-289.; T.O. Elias, Customary 
Law in Africa Manchester 1956. pp.145-152.; D. Diallo, "Profil de la culture des Fulbe" in: Spécifités 
et convergences culturelles dans l'Arfique au sud du Sahara, UNESCO, Paris 198. p.30.; KM'Baye, 
"Les droits de l'homme en Afrique", in: Les dimensions internationales des droits de l'homme (ed. 
K. Vasak) Paris 1978. p.651. The connection between rights and duties is supported by the tenets 
of the continent's religions, see Mbiti, op.cit. supra n. l l . , at pp.59-65.; A A Said, "Human Rights in 
Islamic Perspectives", in: Human Rights: Ctdtural and Ideological Perspectives (eds. A Pollis and 
P. Schwab) New York 1979- pp.92-93-; P B. Clarke, "Islam, Development and African Identity" in: 
Religion, Development and African Identity (ed.JCH. Petersen) Uppsala 1987. pp.125-143. 
1 5 Elias, idem, at p. 152. 
connection between the individual and other individuals or the whole 
community, the individual can be defined by these connections and by his 
autonomus acts.16 The rights of the individual exist and are realized in these 
connections, which supports the principle that the performance of duties is the 
precondition of enjoyment of any rights. At the same time, the community takes 
priority over the individual. The rights of the individual appear in the context of 
communal activities, they are of a collective character, and the individual enjoys 
them by the fact of belonging to the community, not as an abstract individual, or 
by the fact of his human nature. These suggestions involve important 
consequences in the area of human rights. 
There are no abstract, autonomous individuals who are substantially 
independent of the community, but only members of the community. With this 
premise, it is possible to cast doubt on rights arising purely from the human 
quality of the individual, because all rights can be interpreted and described in 
the context of communal activities. In this conception, the individual's rights, 
per definitionem, do not qualify as human rights at all, and this model threatens 
the very notion of human rights. 
Furthermore, these premises throw open the door to relativism not only 
in practice, but also in theory.17 
The enjoyment of human rights can be made contingent upon the social 
and cultural context in an absolute sense, which challenges the existence of a 
general standard based on the individual's human quality. 
Further consequences of this conception in the area of human rights, 
which I have touched upon previously, are: the performance of duties qualifies 
as a precondition to the enjoyment of human rights; the rights of the group, 
community, state, religious organizations, family, etc., as collective rights, may 
take precedence over the individual's human rights.18 
These are the axioms and main suggestions of the African conception 
on individuals, which serve as the theoretical background for the regulation of 
the individual's duties in the Charter, or some of which are directly transplanted 
into the convention. 
However, a theory and an international human rights convention 
constitute different aspects of social reality, even if they have the same object. 
1 6 A Pollis — P. Schwab, "Human Rights: a Western Construct with Limited Applicability" 
in: Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives (eds. A Pollis and P. Schwab) New York 
1979- P-10. 
1 7 Pollis — Schwab, idem, at pp.1-18.; Said, op.cit. supra n.14., at pp.86-92.; DM. Wai 
"Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa" in: Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives 
(eds. A Pollis and P. Schwab) New York 1979- pp.115-119-; a comprehensive survey and criticism 
of cultural relativism: RJ. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, Cambridge 1986. 
pp.37-60.; J. Donelly, "Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critic of Non-Western 
Conceptions of Human Rights" The American Political Science Review 76(1982) pp.303-316. 
1 8 Vincent, idem, at p.39-
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A scientific theory has other functions and purposes than those of a 
human rights convention. Roughly, the main function of theories is the 
description and explanation of reality, while an international convention aimas 
at putting certain purposes into practice according to particular interests of 
state parties. 
There is not doubt that all ideas have a long way to go before they reach 
their own realization, if they reach it at all. The human rights conception of 
developing countries and the underlying theories such as the conception of the 
individual, were first of all acknowledged and accepted at a scientific level as a 
synthesis of certain anthropoligical, ethnographical, sociological and 
philosophical ideas. In the following period, the conception appears at political 
and ideological levels in the political life of various states, undergoing 
assimilation to certain political goals and justifying certain political interests. 
In the third phase, the theory appears in the international area, 
repesenting the aims of developing countries, being manifested in international 
instruments not binding to states (e.g. UNGA resolutions), constituting the basis 
of a new, possible consensus described in general terms. When included in an 
international convention binding to state parties, the theory arrives at the 
threshold of realization. Here, at the fourth level, it emerges how the theory 
operates in practice. 
The point of the distinction between these areas is that each has its own 
peculiarities and functions, operating in the formation of social reality. 
Accordingly, when passing over to and playing another role in another area, the 
conception should be modified to a certain extent in order to meet the specific 
requirements and functions of this area. However, the drafters of the Charter, 
referring to the conception of the individual, took over the idea of the 
individual's duties directly from the scientific and ideological levels, practically 
without modification, and connected it with human rights in the area of binding 
international conventions. 
The question that arises is whether this operation is correct with regard 
to the factions of an international human rights convention, or whether it 
generates further contradictions in the Charter. 
The nature of the individual's duties in international human rights 
conventions 
The African states regulated the individual's duties in detail in the 
Charter, because in their view these duties are inseparable from the position of 
the African individual and from African communal values. Accordingly, they 
wished to provide a regulation corresponding with the position of the individual 
in the social existence in Africa, as described by the above-outlined theory. As 
this conception had always stressed the individual's duties towards his 
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community, they regulated this aspect in the African convention.19 Most of the 
authors considering the provisions of the Charter accept this standpoint. None 
of them challenges the grounds of the detailed duties regulation. Tough some 
authors point out that the individual's duties can serve as a means of limitation 
of human rights and may come into conflict with them, they do not cast explicit 
doubt on the grounds of the regulation.20 Thus Gittleman, who analyzes in 
detail the Charter's limitations to human rights and also Article 6 of the Charter's 
Preamble, does not even mention the regulation of the individual's duties as a 
limiting component.21 
However, there is a logical slip in the reasoning of those who support 
the individual's duties provisions in the African convention. 
Actually, the African conception merely answers the question of the 
reasons for the detailed regulation of the individual's duties, but not the 
question of the purpose thereof. If one examines the studies mentioned above, 
it is clear that the authors perceive the question of "why" in the sense of "what is 
the reason", not in the sense of "what is the purpose". 
The question of "what is the purpose of the individual's duties 
provisions in the Charther" is not necessarily the appropriate one, of course, 
because it entails significant subjective elements. This question still makes it 
possible to go on and apply a fuctional approach. The adequate question can 
only be that of what are the actual functions of the individual's duties provisions 
in the Charter. Analyzing the peoples's rights provisions in the African 
convention, Kunig applies this approach excellently, but he does not take it into 
consideration in the case of the individual's duties.22 
There is no reason to challenge even one of the suggestions of the 
African conception of the individual, because this accurately describes the 
African social reality and the position of individuals in it. 
What is comewhat troublesome is that the drafters turned these 
suggestions into international human rights rules without any significant 
modification. 
An international convention typically imposes obligations upon states 
towards other states. On the other side of the obligations, the beneficiaries of 
stipulated rights can be other states, social groups, citizens, individuals, etc. The 
point of the existence of human rights in international law is that these rules 
See M.L Balanda remark who nember of the drafting expert committee preparing the 
text of the Charter, in the International Law Commission: Yearbook of International Law 
Commission (1984-1) p.48. 
2 0 See e.g. Ngom, op.cit. supra n.6., at p.74.; Donelly, op.cit. supra n.17., at p. 311.; P. 
Kung "The Protection of Human Rights by International Law in Africa" German Yearbook of 
International Law 25(1982) p.159-; O.Ojo - A Sesay, "The OAU and Human Rights" Human Rights 
Quarterly 1986/1. p.99-
2 1 Gittleman, op.cit. supra n. 5., at pp.690-709. 
2 2 See Kunig, op.cit. supra n.-20., at pp.156-159-
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defend the individual against his own, or more rarley some other state by means 
of international guarantees. 
These international guarantees are intended to compensate to some 
extent the dominance of the state over the individual. Being a subsidiary 
instrument, the international human rights regulation has an intended direct 
impact on national legislations and hence an indirect effect on the position of 
the individual. The principal function of the international human rights 
regulation is that states undertake certain obligations towards other states in 
favor of the individual or various social groups.25 
As concerns these suggestions, the question arises as to the extent to 
which it makes sense to regulate the individual's duties in an international 
human rights convention. It has been seen that the individual's duties are 
enforced by the state without respect to the beneficiaries. This kind of 
regulation therefore includes the absurdity that in an international convention 
the state stipulates international guarantees in favor of itself to ensure the 
enforcement of some duties against the individual. This does not make any 
sense because the state has effective means to enforce these duties. 
The individual's duties towards his family, for instance, inasmuch as 
these can be described in legal terms, are a matter of national laws and it is fairly 
pointless to guarantee the enforcement of these duties by an international 
convention. The whole conception of international human rights is based on the 
state's dominance over the individual. It does not make sense in the existing 
system of international human rights to stipulate sui generis state rights against 
the individual. 
There is another, more theoretical counter-argument based on the 
notion of duty. Daes, in the most comprehensive United Nations study on the 
problem, accepts the definition of duty according to which duty is based on an 
explicit and concrete, or implicit and general, contract or undertaking, on the 
part of one who has a duty.24 
It is quite difficult to establish what kind of consent exists on the 
individual's part to the condition that the state representing the individual in the 
international area can stipulate rights in favor of itself against the represented 
individual. This consent can be established in constitutional law, but not in the 
case of an international convention. The interrelationship between self-interest 
and public interest, people and state, appears in diverse ways in the national 
and international area. The individual's duties included in constitutions may 
have a well-circumscribed function, which fits the whole of the constitutional 
system. The functions of a constitution are different from those of an 
international human rights convention. 
Hence the functions of international human rights conventions permit 
only the same conclusion as that we have reached previously: the regulation of 
the individual's duties in the Charter cannot be of a sui generis character, 
23 A Siegbart, The International Law of Human Rights Oxford 1984. p.20. 
2 4 E/CN.4/Sub.2/432 Rev.l. para.4321 
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because in this case these provisions become meaningless. The individual's 
duties can only be regarded as a means of limitation of human rights. 
The next step is to look at the problems presented by this direct 
relationship. 
The individual's duties and human rights 
The issue of the individual's duties is one of the fundamental tenets of 
the African conception of the individual. This duty conception has a well-
defined function in the description of African social reality. However, when 
transplanted into another area, that of international conventions, the theory 
loses its original fuction, and acquires another role, which happens to be 
contrary to the general purpose of the Charter. These duty provisions may give 
state parties the possibilities to evade certain stipulations including rights, and 
we have seen previously that this limitation is their only function. 
However, human rights are not absolute ones; it is necessary to restrict 
them in binding international instruments. There are generally accepted kinds of 
limitation, such as clawback clauses. Why shouldn't the Charter's duty 
provisions be regarded as an appropriate form ot limitation of the granted 
human rights? 
There are three factors which together make Articles 27-29 clearly 
dysfunctional and not a proper form of limitation: 
a) the large number of regulated duties; 
b) the undefined, vague and general nature of most of the duties; 
c) the duties are not related to particular rights, but to all the granted 
rights, that is to say every duty may concern every right as a restricting factor. 
These characteristics of regulated duties allow state parties great 
freedom in interpreting the borders of the granted rights, at the same time 
reducing the effectivity and extent of state undertaking concerning human 
rights. This does not fit the functions of international human rights regulation. 
The dysfunctional character of the individual's duties in the African convention 
gives rise to further problems, which can be regarded as a manifestation of the 
dysfunction. Even if one accepts that there are a number of tudites included in 
the Charter, it is not clear what the underlying relation between rights and 
duties is. 
These duties can be regarded as preconditions of the enjoyment of 
human rights. This is supported by paragraph 6 of the Charter's Preamble, and 
by the whole African conception of the individual. Balanda writes: "The rights 
and liberties that the Charter intends to confer on individuals are in return for 
the duties that the Charter imposes upon them".25 In this case, the performance 
of these duties gives a basis for the enjoyment of human rights, and the rights 
qualify as a reward for the performance of duties. 
2 5 Balanda, op.cit. supra n.7., at p.139-
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In this conception, however, these granted rights are not human rights 
in the proper sense, because they are not attached to the human quality of the 
individual. If the performance of the individual's duties is considered to be a 
precondition of the enjoyment of human rights, this means the negation of the 
classical human rights conception, and of the spirit of other international human 
rights instruments. The other approach would regard the role of the individual's 
duties in another perspective, not as preconditions. In this case, the restriction 
of human would amount to a kind of sanction for failing to perform duties. This 
supposes a looser connection between rights and duties than that in the 
possibility of the limitation of human rights would exist in a similar way. 
Since African states do stipulate duties in the Charter, it is a correct 
presumption that certain sanctions are intended to apply if the individual does 
not observe his duties. The question of what sanctions may be applied if the 
individual violated his duties implies the whole set of problems of the 
individual's duties. 
In the event of the violation of human rights, state parties may meet 
different, more or less determined procedures and sanctions in the international 
area. However, if the individual does not perform his duties, what are the 
sanctions against him? 
The Charter is silent about this problem. Umozurike emphasizes: 
"Although individual duties are enumerated, there is no provision for 
enforcement against individuals. It therefore falls on states to enforce 
observance on individuals within their territory."26 
In the final analysis, the individual's failure to perform his duties can be 
sanctioned only by the state through international law. At an international level, 
in the frame of international human rights regulation, there is no sense in 
stipulating sanctions against the individual on account of his failure to observe 
his duties. This issue belongs, on the whole, to the relation between state and 
individual, where the state can enforce the performance of duties without 
international guarantees. 
Whether we conceive the relation between rights and duties in the 
context of a precondition or in the context of a sanction, both involve a fairly 
narrow approach. Both cases, as forms of limitation of human rights by the 
individual's duties, imply that the state can limit human rights only if the 
individual has violated his duties. These forms of limitation are subsequent and 
individual, because the previous violation is necessarily supposed. However, 
Article 27/2/ of the Charter makes it expressis verbis possible to limit human 
rights without any previous violation of duties. In this case, the limitation is 
previous and general 
If the detailed duties in Articles 28-29 mean specified forms of the 
general provision provided by Article 27/2/ they may permit a previous and 
general limitation of the granted rights. Otherwise, these duties give a basis only 
for subsequent and individual limitation. 
2 6 Umozurike, op.cit. cupra n.8., at p.124. 
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Another issue arises when we consider the dysfunctional character of 
the individual's duties provided by the African convention. 
It is not clear whether these duties are of a legal or a moral character. 
Since the Second World War, international agreements have contained an 
increasing number of stipulations of a purely declarative nature, which are 
"declarations of intention" rather than undertakings of obligations. Although 
they are couched in legal form, they cannot be enforced because they are not 
applicable directly with regard to their content. Most of the individual's duties in 
the Charter are moral, not legal ones, and their impact on social practice is not 
clear at all. 
In the case of international obligations imposed upon states by 
international conventions, these kinds of unenforcable generalities do not 
necessarily amount to a dysfunctional factor, but a technique of concluding 
treaties, and this may perform an important function. There are many questions 
in the international sphere which cannot be regulated by international 
agreements because of the conflicting interests of states. However, the 
formulation of these issues in general norms of a purely declarative character in 
content may constitute the first step towards a more applicable, specified 
consensus. This function does not exist in the case of the individual's duties, 
which are not stipulated against states. 
An important characteristic of these "frame-norms" is that they leave the 
door completely open to diverse posibilities of interpretation. On account of 
their general character, they may be compatible with different interpretative 
attempts that are contrary to one another, and these interpretative possibilities 
may include the non-application of the provision. From our point of view, this is 
not an important problem when these obligations are imposed upon states, 
because the non-application of the norm may be in the interest of the state. 
In the case of the individual's duties, the state has no obligations, and 
the application of these norms may be in its interest. Thus, the wide borders of 
interpretation play another role here, because a wide scope of content may be 
assigned to these norms by a state interested in this. This is especially true if it is 
considered that it is in the state's competence to decide who fails to perform his 
duties, when, how many times, and to what degree, and what sanction should 
be imposed upon him. 
The vague concepts and general frame-norms a a technique of 
concluding treaties obviously involve a dysfunctional character when states 
stipulate individuals' duties as against other international legal norms. This 
dysfunction appears in consequnce of the connection of human rights and the 
individual's duties and of the state's interest to apply these provisions. Those 
characteristics of the framenorms that lead to the impossibility of their 
enforcement in one case may lead to their arbitrary application in another. In 
this latter case, because of the state's interest in the application, these duties of 
a moral character may be enforced if the State "takes them seriously" for the 
purpose of setting a limit to human rights. Accordingly; only in the light of their 
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implementation shall we be able to decide the extent to which these duties have 
become legal ones in their content. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, we can state that the connection of the individual's 
duties and human rights in an international human rights convention may 
diminish the effectivity of the convention, and make it possible for state parties 
to avoid the observance of certain human rights. The stipulation of the 
individual's duties is of a clearly dysfunctional character as concerns the 
puspose of an international human rights convention. This unusual solution in 
many respects breaks with the traditional conception of international human 
rights, and at the same time raises fundamental problems and contradictions 
that demand an answer. However, the Charter does not answer these problems, 
which anticipates difficulties in the process of implementation. 
The idea of the individual's duties being provided by the Charter is 
derived from the African conception of the individual. However, any theoretical 
conception may be transplanted adequately into another sphere only if the 
regularities of this new sphere are respected. The detailed regulation of the 
individual's duties in an international human rights convention does not meet 
this requirement. With these conclusions, there is no question of imposing some 
kind of Western value system on the African regime. There is no doubt that, in 
Africa and in developing countries in general, the realtionship between the 
community and the individual has its own peculiarities and values, which cannot 
be disregarded in a correct analysis. However, only certain aspects of the overall 
conception reflecting these peculiarities, and values can appear in a proper way 
in other non-scientific spheres according to the regularities of these spheres, yet 
the entire conception is reflected in these aspects. Otherwise, one must reckon 
with serious contradictions. 
Hence a way has to be found to transplant the theory into the frame of 
an international human rights convention. The particular African conception 
could have appeared in adequate form in the Charter through the particular 
structure of the stipulated human rights. The drafters could have left out a 
number or rights which cannot be enforced under present African 
circumstances, and a clear and specified system of limitations of rights could 
have been drawn up in the text of the convention. 
An excellent opportunity was presented to include some new human 
rights in the Charter (e.g. the rights to food),27 which would have constituted a 
certain answer to the African needs. In this way, the rights provided by the 
2 7 Since then this right has appeared in the Protocol on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights to the American convention (Art.12); for the text, see Internationa] Legal Materials 28(1989) 
pp.161-170. 
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Charter would have shown a particular picture, according to the African values 
and peculiarities. 
The doubts about the individual's duties that appear in an international 
human rights convention are justified by international human rights practice. 
In international human rights conventions, we cannot encounter a 
detailed and general enumeration of the individual's duties linked to human 
rights. For instance, the American convention includes the only reference to the 
individual's duties through the general clause, as against the detailed list of the 
American Declaration. The drafters of the American convention did riot consider 
it possible to link human rights with the individual's duties. 
Though duties appear in the Universal and American Declarations, these 
instruments do not create obligations directly, and do not establish rights. Not 
waiting for immediate realization, these instruments have peculiarities other 
than those of international human rights conventions, and the individual's 
duties are not of a dysfunctional character in declarations, or other, not binding 
provisions. Our conclusions concerning the individual's duties in the Charter 
are not challenged by the fact that duty provisions can be ensountéred in a 
number of constitutions, because the issue here comes up in another context. 
The constitutional principles and rules are typically applied through a 
great number of specified, detailed rules. This latter shere, restricting the 
possibilities of interpretation, gives sphape to the delicate balance between 
individual rights and duties. The international human rights convention, as a 
subsidiary means, endeavors to influence precisely this continuing process of 
formation of this delicate balance. Providing international guarantees, the 
international human rights convention takes side with the individual's principal 
rights, because this side may require support in consequence of the dominance 
of the state power over the individual. The function of the international human 
rights convention is thus quite distinct from that of an constitution, even in 
respect of human rights and duties. Accordingly, the component of the Third 
World human rights conception that the individual's duties call for detailed 
regulation in international human rights conventions does not seem correct. 
This does not mean the appropriate expression and reflection of the particular 
situation of the individual in the developing countries, but instead may lead to a 
considerable reduction of the effectivity of the international guarantees 
established to protect and promote human rights. 
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